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**Registrant Housing Crisis in Utah
A Comprehensive Report on 10 Months
of Housing Assistance Data**

March 2026

Office of
UTAH FOR RATIONAL SEX OFFENSE LAWS

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To the Housing Stability Division and HEART:

Attached is our comprehensive report on registrant housing instability in Utah, documenting ten months of housing assistance data collected by Utah for Rational Sex Offense Laws (UTRSOL) between June 2025 and March 2026. The report summarizes 121 cases, 197 individuals, 14 agencies and nonprofits, and a geographic footprint spanning 10 Utah counties. It draws on a legislative and service-provider record developed across the 2026 Utah General Session and our ongoing case intake operations. (Publication #2026-29).

The report identifies two policy levers within or adjacent to the Division's administrative authority, modification of Good Landlord Program screening criteria and shelter intake protocol conditions for referred registrant cases, and proposes a coordinating committee co-sponsored by Fourth Street Clinic, Volunteers of America Utah, and The Road Home. Each action is scoped to require no new legislation, no new budget, and no public position on registry law.

We are presenting this material to you in the context of our meeting with HEART and welcome the opportunity to discuss how the Division's participation in a coordinated stakeholder response would ground any administrative action in multi-agency evidence rather than advocacy.

Sincerely

Utah for Rational Sex Offense Laws

UTRSOL/lm

1. About UTRSOL

Utah for Rational Sex Offense Laws (UTRSOL) is a multi-functional criminal justice reform organization founded in April 2025 and based in Layton, Utah. We operate simultaneously as a legislative advocacy body, policy research organization, and journalism outlet, with our Founder and Interim Chairman serving as our primary public representative.

1.1 Organizational Programs

Our work is organized across four core program areas. In housing and employment, we collaborate with a small network of nonprofit partners and private property owners willing to rent to individuals on the sex offense registry, and we maintain a curated database of employers known to hire registrants. In legislative advocacy, we provided public comment during the 2026 Utah General Session on 13 bills, analyzing each against the evidentiary record on recidivism, public safety, and registration compliance.

In research and legal advisory, we maintain an informal collaboration with Sex Offense Treatment Program (SOTP)-affiliated clinicians and criminal defense attorneys coordinating litigation strategy for registry reform. We apply an evidence-proportionality standard to all policy positions, explicitly distinguishing ourselves from civil liberties organizations and the defense bar. We support punitive measures where the evidence justifies them, and oppose measures where it does not.

1.2 Why We Are Presenting to HEART

UTRSOL has responded to housing assistance cases involving individuals on the sex offense registry, their families, friends, religious leaders, and social services across the state. We do this with no paid staff, no operating budget, and no formal mandate — through a grassroots, volunteer-driven model grounded in community necessity. Despite these limitations, our efforts have consistently filled critical gaps in support where no formal systems exist.

The Salt Lake City Housing Stability Division and its Homeless Engagement and Response Team (HEART) represent the government body with the closest institutional authority over the problem we have documented. This report presents our data and proposes a coordinated response, not as advocacy, but as a request for institutional engagement grounded in documented operational need.

2. Ten Months of Data: The Snapshot

UTRSOL was founded in April 2025. Within weeks of our website launch, registrants began contacting us directly for housing assistance — before we had staff, a budget, or a formal intake process. The volume and consistency of that contact made clear that we were not encountering isolated cases; we were encountering the visible edge of a systemic problem without a designated institutional owner.

Between June 2025 and March 2026, we responded to 121 housing assistance cases, providing services to 197 individuals across those households. In ten months, our caseload reached 10 Utah counties and involved coordination with 14 agencies and nonprofits including emergency shelters, behavioral health providers, government bodies, and faith organizations. None of those agencies were recruited by UTRSOL. Each reached out to us independently after encountering registry-related housing barriers they could not resolve through existing channels.



The gap between 121 cases and 197 individuals is the central finding of this report. Registry housing policy treats the registrant as the only person affected. Our data shows otherwise. The 76 non-registrant individuals across those households committed no offense and appear on no registry. They are experiencing housing instability as a direct downstream consequence of exclusionary policies they had no part in creating. The 27 children present in family cases represent the most acute manifestation of that consequence.

These figures represent a floor, not a ceiling. Cases we did not receive — from registrants who do not know we exist, from rural counties with no service infrastructure, and from individuals who gave up after a first rejection — are not reflected here. The true scope of unmet need is therefore significantly greater than what is captured in these numbers. Without broader outreach and systemic support, many individuals will remain unseen and unserved.

3. Geographic Distribution Across Utah

Our caseload spans 10 of Utah’s 29 counties. The distribution is not random. It reflects the geography of exclusion: where exclusion zones are densest, where shelter policies are most restrictive, and where registrants have the fewest compliant housing options within viable proximity to employment and supervision compliance requirements.

County	Clients	Households	% of Clients	HH / Client
Salt Lake	66	105	54.5%	1.56
Davis	20	37	16.8%	1.85
Weber	12	18	9.9%	1.50
Utah	10	17	7.9%	1.70
Washington	4	5	3.0%	1.25
Tooele	2	8	2.0%	4.00
Box Elder	2	4	2.0%	2.00
Cache	2	3	2.0%	1.50
Iron	1	1	1.0%	1.00
Sevier	1	1	1.0%	1.00
TOTAL	121	197	100%	1.63

3.1 The Wasatch Front Concentration

Salt Lake, Davis, and Weber counties together account for 81% of all cases. This concentration is not simply a function of population density. It reflects the density of exclusion zones and the severity of shelter policy in the urban core. Registrants excluded from Salt Lake City options are searching northward into Davis County without finding meaningfully different conditions. The geographic search pattern itself is evidence of systemic unavailability, not individual preference.

3.2 Tooele: The Most Acute Per-Capita Data Point

Tooele County produced the most striking per-capita finding in our dataset: two clients generated eight household members across two households of five and three. A household-to-client ratio of 4.0 — the highest in our data — indicates families in acute crisis. These individuals have no nearby shelter, no transit corridor to Salt Lake City services, and no compliant housing inventory within a viable commute. Tooele is not an outlier in kind; it is an illustration of what rural cases look like when they become visible.

3.3 Rural Cases Are Undercounted

Iron, Sevier, Box Elder, and Cache counties each produced only one or two client contacts. This almost certainly does not reflect the actual need. Rural registrants are less likely to know UTRSOL exists, less likely to have internet access for self-referral, and more likely to have given up after a first rejection with no secondary resource available. Our rural figures are a floor in the most acute sense: they reflect only the registrants who both knew to call and had the means to do so.

3.4 Salt Lake City as the Policy Template

Neighboring counties will look to Salt Lake City for a policy model as this problem becomes visible statewide. What the Division and HEART establish here — in practice and in policy documentation — will function as a precedent. This is an opportunity to set that precedent proactively, on the basis of documented evidence, rather than reactively under pressure.

4. Who We Served: Household and Demographic Breakdown

4.1 Inquiries by Household Type

Our 121 cases divide into three household types: single registrants (55% of cases, 34% of persons), couples (31% of cases, 38% of persons), and families (13% of cases, 28% of persons). Each segment presents a distinct policy problem and a distinct downstream risk.

Household Type	% of Cases	% of Persons	Primary Policy Problem
Single Males	55%	34%	Landlord screening; shelter blanket exclusion; GPS technical violations
Couples	31%	38%	Non-registrant partner penalized; clean rental history discarded when bundled
Families	13%	28%	27 children; DCFS housing stability metric; state child welfare cost exposure

Single males represent the largest volume of cases but the lowest per-case complexity. Their primary barriers are landlord automated screening and shelter blanket exclusion. Many are sleeping in vehicles, camping, or cycling through acquaintances' housing because no formal option will accept them. Each is one technical violation from incarceration, since GPS compliance requires a registered address.

Couples present a distinct problem: 38 non-registrant partners who committed no offense and appear on no registry cannot use their own clean rental history when bundled with a registrant's application. Some shelters exclude couples where one person is registered, leaving both without options. The housing instability these individuals experience is entirely derivative of the registrant's legal status — not their own.

Families, the smallest group by case count, represent the highest-stakes subset. Sixteen families encompassed 27 children experiencing housing instability as a direct result of exclusionary policies. The Utah Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) prioritizes housing stability as a child welfare metric and has a documented interest in preventing family separation attributable to housing loss. The state's own child welfare framework creates a policy rationale for intervention in this population that does not require ideological agreement with registry reform.

4.2 Inquiries by Registrant Gender

96% of our inquiries involved male registrants, which mirrors the composition of Utah's sex offense registry (approximately 97% male). This alignment confirms that our data reflects the actual registry population, not a function of outreach bias or self-selection artifacts. This consistency strengthens the reliability of our findings and supports their relevance for broader policy considerations.

The 4% female rate — five registrants — is almost certainly a floor, not a finding. Shelter co-location policies create a structural exclusion unique to female registrants: most operators resolve the administrative complication of registry-listed women in women's shelters through denial rather than accommodation. Female registrants turned away at first contact are unlikely to persist to a second resource, making undercounting near-certain. These cases require distinct intake protocols. Co-location in a women's shelter does not resolve registry-related barriers; it relocates them.

4.3 Who Initiates Contact

63% of contact was initiated directly by registrants or their partners. The remaining 37% came from non-registrant initiators, which is the more significant finding. Seventeen professional social workers and case managers contacted UTRSOL because they had exhausted their own systems. Each represents an unresolvable case in a professional intake framework — evidence of a structural gap, not an individual problem.

Fifteen contacts came from parents — likely middle-aged or elderly adults absorbing adult children into their own housing or attempting to prevent street homelessness. This secondary burden is invisible in virtually every policy and service accounting framework. Four contacts came from LDS Branch Presidents and other religious leaders who called after exhausting informal congregational support options. These four represent a much larger population being quietly managed at the level of individual congregations, outside any formal service system.

5. Agencies and Organizations That Contacted UTRSOL

UTRSOL did not recruit any of the 14 agencies and organizations listed below. Each reached out to us independently after encountering registry-related housing barriers they could not resolve through existing channels. This is the most structurally significant fact in our data: professional service providers with established systems and institutional resources have identified a gap those systems cannot address. They are routing that gap to a volunteer organization with no staff and no budget.

Emergency Shelters	Behavioral Health
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Lantern House The Road Home The Inn Between Switchpoint Microshelter 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Valley Behavioral Health Wasatch Behavioral Health Fourth Street Clinic
Nonprofits & Faith	Government Agencies
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Almost There Nonprofit Utah Case Management Volunteers of America Utah LDS Branch Presidents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weber Housing Authority Salt Lake Police Department Salt Lake City Housing Division

The Salt Lake City Housing Division’s presence on this list is particularly notable. It means the Division has already recognized UTRSOL as a resource for registry-related housing cases. The Salt Lake Police Department contact is equally significant: it signals that the problem has crossed into law enforcement’s operational concern. Someone within SLPD is trying to find solutions, not merely enforce violations. This level of engagement from both housing and law enforcement agencies highlights the urgent need for coordinated, cross-sector responses. It also validates UTRSOL’s role as a trusted intermediary capable of bridging gaps between systems and the affected community.

When 17 professional case managers, multiple emergency shelters, three behavioral health providers, a housing authority, a police department, and the City's own Housing Division all arrive at the same wall independently, the wall is the problem. That consensus of professional identification is a stronger basis for institutional action than any advocacy position. It reflects a pattern of systemic failure observed across disciplines, not a difference in perspective or approach. Ignoring that convergence risks perpetuating a barrier that is already well-documented by those working on the front lines.

6. Why Compliant Housing Is Inaccessible

6.1 Good Landlord Program: The Internal Contradiction

The Salt Lake City Good Landlord Program (GLP), established in October 2004, provides financial incentives — reduced licensing fees and regulatory benefits — to participating landlords in Salt Lake City and 14 other Utah municipalities. Participating landlords are mandated to conduct criminal background checks and are directed toward categorical denial of applicants with sex offense convictions or registry status. These policies effectively limit housing access for registrants, regardless of individual risk or rehabilitation status.

The contradiction this creates is structural and directly relevant to HEART's mission. Salt Lake City funds the Housing Stability Division and HEART to address chronic homelessness among its most difficult-to-house populations. Simultaneously, the city subsidizes exclusionary screening through the GLP that removes compliant housing options from registrants. The same registrants excluded by GLP-screened landlords appear in the HEART caseload. The city is paying to create the problem and paying to manage the consequences of it.

The Good Landlord Program's screening criteria are a policy choice, not a statutory mandate. They can be revised through an administrative process. The Division has standing to initiate that conversation. By adjusting these criteria, the city could align its housing subsidies with its homelessness reduction goals. Administrative revision would create immediate, actionable relief for registrants currently shut out of housing. This approach leverages existing city authority without requiring new legislation or additional funding.

6.2 Jurisdictional Precedent for GLP Reform

Salt Lake City would not be acting without precedent. At minimum two major jurisdictions have revised GLP-equivalent screening criteria through administrative or legislative action. These examples demonstrate that reform is both feasible and grounded in established policy practice.

Seattle, WA (2018)	Denver, CO (2023)
<p>Seattle, WA — Fair Chance Housing Ordinance (2018)</p> <p>Seattle’s ordinance prohibits landlords from categorically denying housing based on criminal history. Landlords must conduct individualized assessment weighing time since offense, rehabilitation evidence, and nexus to tenancy. The ordinance applies to all city-licensed rental units, including those in incentive programs equivalent to the GLP.</p>	<p>Denver, CO — Fair Housing & Criminal Records Policy (2023)</p> <p>Denver amended its rental licensing requirements to prohibit categorical denial based on criminal history. Assessment must consider the nature and severity of the offense, time elapsed, and relationship to housing risk. The Denver Housing Authority separately adopted individualized screening for all subsidized and incentive-program properties.</p>

The Division and HEART can cite these models as evidence of a recognized best practice — not an untested policy experiment. Both jurisdictions implemented reform through administrative channels, not legislative action, which means the pathway does not require a return to the Utah Legislature.

6.3 Service Provider Exclusion as a Systemic Pattern

Housing exclusion does not exist in isolation. It is part of a broader pattern of service exclusion that is actively being reinforced by legislation in real time. The following providers maintain explicit exclusion policies for registry-listed individuals.

Provider	Exclusion Policy
The Other Side Academy / Village	Explicit policy: does not accept individuals on the sex offense registry
Cirque Lodge (Substance Use Treatment)	Does not accept individuals on the sex offense registry
Odyssey House (2025)	Does not accept registered individuals into its program
Millcreek Overflow Shelter (2021)	Demanded the State provide alternative placement; refused referrals of registrants
HB 205 — STEP Supervision Program (2026)	Signed March 18, 2026: individuals with pending sex offense charges ineligible

HB 205 is particularly significant in this context: it was signed by the Governor on March 18, 2026. This demonstrates that service exclusion is not a static historical condition; it is a policy direction being actively legislated

in the current environment. The Division’s response to registry housing barriers exists against this backdrop. It underscores the urgency for local administrative action to mitigate the unintended consequences of state policy. Proactive measures by the Division can provide immediate relief while broader legislative frameworks continue to evolve.

7. Two Policy Levers for Housing Reform

The policy problem documented in this report has two addressable dimensions, each with a distinct lever. The first is the Good Landlord Program’s categorical screening criteria, which discourage individualized assessment and effectively preclude registry-listed applicants from accessing a significant share of the city’s rental market. The second is the blanket exclusion policies maintained by emergency shelters, many of which are administrative rather than statutory and are therefore subject to modification through coordination and contract conditions.

Neither lever requires new legislation. Neither requires HEART to take a public position on registry law. Both operate within the administrative and coordination authority the Division already possesses. Addressing these levers can produce tangible outcomes for registrants without altering the broader legal framework. By acting administratively, the Division can demonstrate leadership and set a precedent for other municipalities facing similar challenges.

7.1 Conditional Incentives for Landlords

The most practical approach to reconciling the Good Landlord Program with fair-chance housing goals is to address the financial and liability concerns that discourage inclusive rental practices. Four specific mechanisms are within or adjacent to city administrative authority.

Mechanism	Description
Liability Shields	Clarify that landlords cannot be held civilly liable solely for renting to an individual with a criminal record, including registry status. This addresses the primary legal risk landlords articulate as a barrier to inclusion.
Insurance Subsidies	Reduce coverage costs for landlords who rent to justice-involved individuals, lowering the financial barrier to inclusion and making the risk calculus less asymmetric.
Tax Incentives	Reward landlords who make units available to registry-impacted individuals, counterbalancing the exclusionary pressure created by GLP categorical screening.
Risk-Reduction Services	Fund ongoing case management, housing mediation, and rapid-response support services, giving landlords practical reassurance and reducing the perceived risk of tenancy failure.

These mechanisms should be coupled with an individualized risk assessment framework that replaces categorical denial. The relevant factors are well-established in the literature and in peer jurisdictions: time since offense, rehabilitation completion status, employment stability, current supervision status, community support network, and rental and housing history. Incorporating these factors allows landlords and service providers to make decisions based on actual risk rather than blanket assumptions. Such an approach balances public safety concerns with the need to expand housing access for compliant registrants.

8. What the Division and HEART Can Do

The actions available to the Division and HEART do not require new authority, new legislation, or a public position on registry law. They require the exercise of administrative relationships the Division already has and the documentation of a need the Division has already been made aware of by its own institutional peers.

01

Recommend Good Landlord Program Screening Modifications

The GLP is city-administered. Its screening incentives are not written into state statute. HEART has documented standing to recommend formally that program administrators revise their criteria to require individualized assessment rather than categorical denial. This does not mandate acceptance of all registrants. It requires participating landlords to consider individual circumstances. That is a narrowly scoped administrative recommendation — not a policy position on registry law.

Seattle and Denver have already implemented equivalent reforms through administrative channels. HEART can cite those models as evidence of recognized best practice.

02

Modify Shelter Intake Policies for Referred Registrant Cases

Several shelters in this report maintain blanket exclusion policies that are not required by state law. They are administrative policies. Where the Division funds or coordinates with these providers, that relationship creates a lever.

The appropriate condition is not a mandate to accept all registrants. It is a requirement that intake decisions be documented and individualized — that each case receive a written assessment rather than a categorical denial. Documentation alone reduces arbitrary exclusion and creates an evidentiary record that supports future administrative action.

03

Co-Sponsor a Coordinating Committee with Nonprofits and Public Health Organizations

UTRSOL has proposed the formation of a Coordinating Committee, to be co-sponsored by Fourth Street Clinic, Volunteers of America Utah, and The Road Home. This committee would serve as a public-facing resource to articulate the policy rationale, document the underlying conditions, and provide a unified, credible voice across the service provider network.

Participating in the committee allows the Division to demonstrate it is responding to a documented need already flagged by SLPD, Weber Housing Authority, and 14 other case managers across the state — not acting on advocacy.

By leveraging existing authority, the Division can implement meaningful change immediately. Clear documentation of need also strengthens the case for coordinated action and ensures that interventions are data-driven rather than ad hoc.

9. The Collaborative Initiative: A Coordinated Stakeholder Response

The coordinating committee structure is deliberately low-commitment. It requires no new law, no new budget, and no new authority. It requires a room — and HEART’s presence in it. Participants contribute from their existing roles and expertise, minimizing administrative burden while maximizing impact. This structure creates a forum for shared problem-solving, ensuring that all relevant perspectives inform practical solutions.

Coordinating Meeting	What It Produces
<p>Three co-sponsors: Volunteers of America Utah, Fourth Street Clinic, The Road Home</p> <p>One meeting: A two-hour in-person working session at a neutral venue (University of Utah or State Capitol)</p> <p>Narrow scope: A documentation working group — not a policy body. Each agency submits client counts, geographic search data, and housing type needs. Nothing more is required at the outset.</p>	<p>A unified, credible record: Aggregated data from 14 agencies that encountered the same barrier independently.</p> <p>A shared basis for action: Committee output supports any Division decision on GLP screening or shelter intake protocols, grounded in multi-agency evidence.</p> <p>Cover for the Division and HEART: Action framed by a coordinated stakeholder record is a measured institutional response — not a policy position on registry law.</p>

When this many professional agencies arrive at the same wall independently, the wall is the problem. The Division and HEART’s participation makes this credible. Without you, it is advocacy. With you, it is evidence. Your involvement signals institutional recognition of a systemic issue rather than an isolated complaint. It also provides the authority needed to drive coordinated, actionable solutions across agencies.

10. Conclusion

The data in this report was generated with no staff, no budget, and no formal mandate over a period of ten months. It documents 121 housing assistance cases, 197 individuals, 14 agencies, and 10 counties — all of which surfaced through inbound contact. We did not go looking for this problem. The problem came to us.

The 197 individuals in our caseload include 27 children, 38 non-registrant partners, and 15 elderly or middle-aged parents attempting to absorb adult children to prevent street homelessness. These individuals are invisible in virtually every policy conversation about the sex offense registry, and they

are experiencing housing instability as a direct downstream consequence of exclusionary policies they had no part in creating.

The Good Landlord Program's categorical screening criteria, the shelter blanket exclusion policies, and the absence of an individualized assessment framework are not statutory requirements. They are administrative policy choices. They can be revised through administrative processes. The Division has the standing and the relationships to initiate those processes.

The three actions we are requesting are proportionate to the documented need: a formal recommendation on GLP screening criteria, a condition of documentation and individualization on shelter intake protocols for referred cases, and co-sponsorship of a coordinating meeting with established nonprofit partners. None require legislative action. None require a public position on registry law. All three are grounded in the same evidentiary standard the Division applies to every other housing stability problem it is asked to address.

We are available to provide additional data, documentation, or technical support at any stage of the Division's engagement with this issue. The coordinating committee structure exists specifically to expand the evidentiary base beyond what a single organization can document alone.

